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PROTECTION OF THE FAMILY UNDER TORT LAW
By LEON GREEN*
In Deskotel v. A.T. & S.F. Ry. Co.' plaintiff wife was denied recovery
for her loss sustained on account of the physical injury of her husband
through the negligence of defendant. Her loss was identified as consortium,
i.e., conjugal society, comfort, affections and companionship. The problem
presented is but one of many problems involved in the protection of the
family and its members through tort law. To individualize the injury to a
particular member of the family and take it out of its family setting is to
shut out many of the considerations which should bear on the solution of
the problem.
Doctrinal Dijiculties
In order to clear the ground of a troublesome non-essential it is well pre-
liminarily to dispose of the doctrinal difficulty involved in such cases. As
indicated in the court's opinion and in cases in which a contrary conclusion
has been reached there is adequate doctrine to support or deny recovery in
the specific case. In the Hitaffer case,2 for example, Judge Clark had a field
day demolishing the doctrines which courts have employed to deny a recov-
ery, and had no difficulty in developing doctrine to support a recovery. The
District Court of Appeal 3 and the dissenting judge4 in the Supreme Court
of California likewise found no trouble in providing doctrinal support for
the recovery by the wife. The basis for recovery is comparatively simple,
namely, the wife has an interest in her husband equal to that he has in her.
The interest of each has its source in the marital or family relation. This
interest is given recognition and protection in numerous cases and its injury
by a negligent wrongdoer is as serious as in other cases, and the wrongdoer
should be made to compensate her loss.
Courts and practitioners are fully aware that doctrines do not decide
cases. Instead they know that doctrine is but a means of indicating at a
glance the type of case and the policies that should determine its disposition.
Doctrine may pose a problem, and its invocation may indicate the court's
argument and its judgment. Good logical doctrine can ordinarily be found
* B.A., 1908, Ouachita College; LL.B., 1915, University of Texas; LL.D., 1938, Louisiana
State University. Dean, Northwestern University School of Law, 1929-1947. Formerly Professor
of Law, Yale University, Texas University, and currently Professor of Law, University of Cali-
fornia, Hastings College of Law. Member of the Connecticut, Texas and Illinois Bars.
150 Cal. 2d ......... 328 P.2d 449 (1958), noted in 10 HASTINGS LJ. 214 (1958).
2 Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
3 Deshotel v. Atchison, T.&S.F. Ry., 319 P.2d 357 (Cal. App. 1958). Opinion may be found
in 156 A.C.A. 325.
450 Cal. 2d at ......... 328 P.2d at 452.
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to support any end that ought to be reached, and, if a good quality of doc-
trine is not at hand, courts not infrequently take second or third grade
doctrine as a basis of indicating their judgment. But the decision of cases
must rest on something more substantial than doctrine unless the problem
has already been resolved by prior litigation and reduced to pattern so that
similar cases do not have to be fought out again.
The protection that courts have given the family and its members under
tort doctrines has developed slowly. These doctrines have still not fully
matured as is indicated by the case under discussion. To appeal to common
law doctrine is to appeal to something still in process of formulation and
growth. The California court was called upon to establish the doctrine for
California in a new situation. It was presented with the opportunity to make
any one of several choices. It made its choice but it is doubtful that it did
so on the basis of doctrine. The doctrines mentioned, to say the least, are
shopworn. The doctrinal difference between "direct" and "indirect"5 has
little if any significance except in the lore of the forms of action. The dif-
ficulty of evaluating the loss in terms of money cannot be taken seriously
when such evaluation is done every day for similar and even less tangible
losses. The "extension of common law liability" as a limitation on a court
that has given voice to so much that is good in modern tort law sounds a
strange note of self-restraint.0
Policies
This does not mean that the court's decision does not rest on solid
grounds, but if so, it is not because of its doctrinal arguments but because
of the policies which support its decision. The chief policies disclosed by the
opinion are the difficulty of "drawing a line," the probability of "double
recovery," and the desirability for "legislative" rather than "judicial ac-
tion." 7 Whether the court considered other policies is not known but it is not
unusual for courts to be moved by considerations which are not disclosed.
Drawing a Line
The fear of being unable to "draw a line" has been a strong and legiti-
mate factor in limiting liability in numerous important tort cases. It de-
ferred for a long time imposition of liability on the manufacturer or supplier
of defective machinery,' liability for injury received through nervous shock
5 1 d. at ........,328 P.2d at 451.
6 Ibid. See California cases cited note 24 infra for some of the many cases in which the
California courts have made radical though needed changes in common law liability.
7 Discussion of policies, ibid.
8 See Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946) ; MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) for a review of earlier cases.
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in absence of physical impact,' liability for injury to unborn infants,10
liability for injury to infant intruders on a landowner's dangerous prem-
ises," and liability in numerous other cases, until the courts found ways of
drawing lines. Here the argument is that if the wife is given a recovery for
loss of consortium then parents and children will also assert rights to re-
cover for similar losses and the court sees no way to meet the argument.
It is not a frivolous argument but it may be that the court did not put the
interests of wife, children and parents in large enough perspective but
focussed instead on the individual rights of the wife rather than upon the
protection of the family-a basic social institution of great importance in
its entirety.
Perhaps the "draw the line" argument is but a phase of the much more
important policy beneath the "double recovery" argument which is believed
to be the most substantial ground the court puts forth as a denial for recov-
ery. It presents difficulties, but those difficulties are greatly lessened by the
light shed by the development of tort law in this area and also by the power
now well recognized on the part of courts through their decisions to deter-
mine practices incident to the proper handling of cases and also by rules
of court.
History
The slow development of the protection of family relations by the Eng-
lish courts was due to several factors, namely: (1) the fact that power over
the family institution was vested in the father and husband with slight legal
protection for its members, except through the father and husband as head
of the family; (2) the exactions of the common law forms of actions; (3)
the ambiguity in the term "consortium." The American courts in the late
1800's and early 1900's made great strides in protecting the family inter-
ests of wife and children. This came about through expansion of the protec-
tion of wife and children through courts of equity and by statute, through
the decline of the husband and father's almost despotic powers, and with
the abolition of the forms of action and the spelling out of the conjugal
relations included in "consortium." The English courts are still enmeshed
in the difficulties created for them by common law history.12
9 Spade v. Lynn & B. R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897) ; Dulieu v. White & Sons,
(1901] 2 K.B. 669.
10 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349,
102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
1 Kahn v. James Burton Co., 5 Ill.2d 614, 126 N.E.2d 836 (1955) ; Bottum's Adm'r v.
Hawks, 84 Vt. 370, 79 Atl. 858 (1911).
12 For a good review of the common law, see Best v. Samuel Fox & Co., [1951] 2 K.B. 639,
[1951] 2 All E.R. 116; [1952] A.C. 716, [1952] 2 All. E.R. 394 (wife denied recovery for par-
tial loss of consortium due to injury rendering husband impotent) ; Fisher, Pater Familis-
A Cooperative Enterprise, 41 ILL. L. REv. 27 (1946).
In Inland Revenue Comm'rs v. Hambrook, [1956] 2 Q.B. 641, 664, Denning, LJ, quoting
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The protection of the family under tort law was first given against inten-
tional wrong to one of its members as the debauching or seduction of a
daughter,1" abduction of an heir, 4 alienation of the wife's affections, 15 crim-
inal conversation" or simple assault and battery.' While the actions were
cast in terms of injury to the individual father or husband as head of the
family, as fitted the political and social philosophy of the times, the protec-
tion was for the family group. Then and in fact until very recently, only two
interests were recognized, namely that of person and property. The group
or relational interests had not yet been identified, nor had it become of equal
importance with person and property as is currently the case.' The group
interests were classified as "property" of the father or the husband and he
maintained the suit, and while the particular member of the family as child
or wife might have individual recoveries in some cases, the principal action
was, and still is, that of the father or husband. As the family was an insti-
tution under the protection and rule of the father and husband with slight
from the first edition of Sir Frederick Pollock's book on Torts published in 1887, at page 194,
says, "'It seems natural enough that an action should lie at the suit of the head of a household
for enticing away a person who is under his lawful authority be it wife, child or servant....
That the same rule should extend to any wrong done to a wife, child or servant, and follow
as a proximate consequence by loss of their society or service is equally to be expected.' It is
to be noted that in that passage and in its setting in the book, Pollock confines the action to
the head of the household in respect to injuries in family relations. The passage has remained
unchanged in every edition from that time to this."
See PROSSER, TORTS 670-77 (2d ed. 1955). See also TIrANY, LAW OF PERSONS AND Do-
mEsTiC RELATIONS §§ 45-46, Actions for Enticing, Harboring or Alienation of Affection; § 47,
Action for Criminal Conversion; §§ 131-33, Action by Parent for Injuries to Child; §§ 134-36,
Action by Parent for Seduction or Debauching of Daughter; §§ 137-38, Action by Parent for
Abducting, Enticing, or Harboring Child (1896); 3 VENIER, A.RmszcAN F mmy LAWS § 158,
at 85; 4 id. § 265, at 461 (1935).
13 Bennett v. Allcott, 2 Term Rep. 166, 100 Eng. Rep. 90 (K.B. 1787).
14 See Magee v. Holland, 27 N.J.L. 86 (1858) ; Pickle v. Page, 252 N.Y. 474, 169 N.E. 650
(1930) for a review of cases. See also PROSSER, TORTS 692 (2d ed. 1955).
15 Adams v. Main, 3 Ind. App. 232, 29 N.E. 792 (1892) ; Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 584,
23 N.E. 17 (1889); Winsmore v. Greenbank, Willes 577, 125 Eng. Rep. 1330 (C.P. 1745);
TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 12, §§ 45, 46. In the Bennett case the wife was given an action
for alienation of husband's affections.
16 Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156, 140 N.E. 227 (1923) (wife's action recognized);
Hargraves v. Ballou, 47 R.I. 186, 131 AtI. 643 (1926).
17Trimble v. Spiller, 23 Ky. (7 T.B. Mon.) 264 (1828) (assault and battery on wife);
Klingman v. Holmes, 54 Mo. 304 (1873) (battery on son; compensatory and exemplary dam-
ages awarded); Tidd v. Skinner, 225 N.Y. 422, 122 N.E. 247 (1919) (actual damages for
selling heroin to son, but no exemplary damages).
18 For development of relational interests see GREEN, MALONE, PEDRICK & RAum, CASES
ON INJURIES TO RELATIONS ch. 2 (1959) ; PROSSER, TORTS 682-86 (2d ed. 1955) ; Cowan, Group
Interests, 44 VA. L. REv. 331 (1958); Green, Persons, Property, Relations, 24 A.B.A.J. 65
(1938) ; Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REv. 1041 (1935), 30 ILL. L. Rv. 314 (1935) ; The Right
of Privacy, 27 IL.. L. REv. 237, 254 (1932).
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legal recognition of the interests of its members, the legal remedies quite
appropriately ran to him as the head of the family.
But any reading of the cases will indicate that along with the "loss of
services" or any other peg on which to support the form of action, other
injuries became increasingly the losses that called the law's protection into
play. These were the more substantial injuries of disgrace, dishonor, humili-
ation, physical and emotional suffering, loss of social standing, conjugal
fellowship and other losses of the family so conveniently cloaked by the
concept of "consortium." 1 The thrust of the action differed only as the
relations of the members of the family differed in the particular case. It need
not be said in passing that as these actions came into the twentieth century
and as the interests of the individual members of the family were given
greater legal recognition, much of the social significance of the original
actions has been forgotten if not lost. But it is believed that what is left of
their significance is based primarily upon their protection of the family as a
group and that for that purpose they serve a useful function.
The Death Acts
The first substantial recognition given to the protection of the family
against physical injuries came with Lord Campbell's Act in 1846 in which
an action for death was given the immediate members of the family, hus-
band or wife, parent and child.' The courts had been so slow in recognizing
the new industrial environment that they had defaulted in swinging the
common law into line and had made it necessary for the more farsighted
Lord Campbell to seek legislative aid. The retreat from the severe liability
of medieval law had been so rapid and so far-flung that when cases under
the death acts, during the second half of the 1800's, began to come to the
courts of both England and America, liability was severely restricted at
every point.21 No piece of legislation, although it merely provided a green
light for the courts, has ever been so ignored in its purpose and certainly
none other has been so weighted down with restrictions. In nearly all juris-
19 See notes 12-18 supra for cases and readings. Striking cases are: Palmer v. Baum, 123
Ill. App. 584 (1905) (defendant liable to father for assault through sexual intercourse with
married adult daughter living in home of father; "The real gravamen of the action is the mor-
tification and disgrace of the family and the wounded feelings of the plaintiff.") ; Bolton v.
Miller, 6 Ind. 262 (1855) (this case marks the breakdown of the half slavery institution of
apprenticeship of young girls).
2o Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93.
21 For a brief development of negligence law with its numerous immunities, see GREN,
TRAffic VicTnss: TORT LAW ANm INSURANCE, chs. 1, 2 (1958) (reviewed in 10 HASIE[ Os LJ.
233 (1958)).
22 For a brief sketch of the early cases interpreting the act, see Buckley v. Chadwick,
45 Cal.2d 183, 288 P.2d 12 (1955). See also PROSSER, TORTS 705-07 (2d ed. 1955) ; Killion,
Wrongful Death Actions in California, Some Needed Amendments, 25 C.n,. L. Rxv. 170
(1937); Green, Injuries Resulting in Death, 38 Ih. L. Rav. 248 (1944); The Texas Death Act,
26 TexAs L. Rav. 133, 461 (1947-48).
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dictions liability was restricted to economic losses. In many cases the dif-
ficulty of assessing economic loss, as for example in the case of a young
child, an aged parent, invalid father or other person without some sort of
earning history, was very great, and the courts showed little imagination in
finding ways to indicate the loss. Instead numerous restrictive formulas
were developed. The action was fettered by all the immunities which had
been developed to relieve the enterpriser from liability in personal injury
cases, and this is still true in many jurisdictions.
Notwithstanding this attitude, today the recoveries in death cases of
every character have risen greatly. The difference in the value of money can
account for only a small part of the increase. Both judges and juries are
refusing to pay too much attention to the restrictions which grew out of the
earlier environments and have found ways to avoid them.' What is now
happening in the death cases is paralleled by what has taken place in per-
sonal injury litigation and indeed all tort litigation. The immunities devel-
oped during the 1800's against liability for both negligent and intentional
injuries have been greatly modified and in many instances wholly removed
and liability today over almost the entire field of tort law is much broader
and recoveries are far greater.'
Double Recovery
The death action was explicitly designed for the protection of the fam-
ily. The survival of personal injury actions serves a like purpose. Is there
any reason to believe that the action for personal injury of a member of the
family is any less so? Does the fact that the members of the family may
have their own actions for personal injuries eliminate the interests of the
23Good examples are found in Poff v. Penn. R.R., 327 U.S. 399 (1946) ; Van Beeck v.
Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 343 (1937); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill.2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525
(1956); 42 VA. L. R v. 687 (1956).
24I.N.S. v. A.P., 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (news service); President and Directors of George-
town College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138
(1946) (unborn child; liability now imposed in many states) ; Jensen v. Minard, 44 Cal.2d 325,
282 P.2d 7 (1955) (firearms); State Rubbish Collection Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330,
240 P.2d 282 (1952) (emotional distress) ; Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal.2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948)
(contractors) ; Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (firearm) ; Orloff v. Los
Angeles Turf Club, 30 Cal.2d 110, 180 P.2d 321 (1947) (civil rights) ; Ybarra v. Spangard,
25 Cal.2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944) (physicians) ; Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal.
328, 270 Pac. 952 (1928) (oil well blowout); Hagy v. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 122 Cal.
App.2d 361, 265 P.2d 86 (1953) (hearing denied by supreme court) (traveler-industrial land-
owner) ; Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954) (charitable hos-
pital); Inman v. Binghampton Housing Authority, 2 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895 (1957)
(builder) ; Mayer v. Temple Properties, 307 N.Y. 559, 122 N.E.2d 909 (1954) (the last in a
long line of litigated cases to recognize the liability of landowners to infant intruders on dan-
gerous industrial premises) ; MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916) (manufacturer).
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family from consideration in the determination of damages where a member
is injured? In case of an injury to the child, aside from the child's action,
the parent has an action for the family loss although it is brought in the
name of the father or in his absence the wife or guardian. If the wife is
injured the husband has his action also and that it is for the benefit of the
family no one can doubt. Why not like actions by child and wife when the
father and husband is injured? Is it not because the action by husband and
father carries with it the losses incurred by the family? The very argument
of "double recovery" concedes as much. All the cases reflect this argument
as does the case under discussion. What then would be more rational than
in the husband and father's action to make explicit provision for the family
losses?
There is little if any disagreement among lawyers that juries in personal
injury actions not only consider the earning capacity of the father or mother
who is injured and his or her economic obligations to the family, but also
consider all the values incident to the marital or parental relation in the
determination of damages. Jurors look to the ability of the defendant to
make money reparation. They likewise look to the family obligations of the
victim, and the family is cared for in so far as the jury can do so within the
limits of its verdict. And unless outrageous the judge will acquiesce though
he may exercise his power to trim the verdict. Even though not a word is
said in the court room beyond the letter of the law and even though the
decorum of the jury room is legally perfect, no juror and no judge can put
out of his mind and heart what he has learned about the defendant. Nor
what he has learned about the needs of the family and the victim's obliga-
tions to its members. He has heard the evidence, observed the parties and
their attendants, and has been keenly aware of all the undertones and over-
tones of the trial.
What happens in death cases explicitly takes place even in greater de-
gree in suits for the personal injury of a member of a family and especially
so if the victim is essential to the economic, emotional and spiritual life of
the family. The family environment is made even more vivid by the appear-
ance of the victim in person along with the members of his family. What-
ever the letter of the law there is nothing that can divert twelve laymen,
and the judge also, from doing what they think is justice as full as the de-
fendant's financial position will permit. This is openly recognized in suits
for seduction, alienation and criminal conversation. While the courts have
continued to talk in the language of the individualism of the 1800's, the
suits themselves have become family actions in the name of the victim, or
the father or husband as the case may be.' All that needs to be done in
Z See notes 12-19 supra. One of the most significant new extensions of tort law in the
family field is the recognition of the child's interest in the integrity of the home through suit
against a third person who "alienates the affections" of mother or father and thus breaks up
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personal injury actions is to re-align and restate the rules of law with what
takes place in the courthouse.
In the action for the injury to Mr. Deshotel,l the husband, there can
be little doubt that the jury in awarding $290,000.00 considered his whole
family environment, whether permitted to do so by the letter of the law or
not. The blackboard calculations of the husband's losses were by no means
conclusive on what was read into them. In the wife's case her counsel clearly
recognized that the family's economic losses had been included in the recov-
ery for her husband by not seeking further recovery for that loss. This was
good sense. Probably even better judgment would have been displayed by
not bringing a second suit to recover for the injury to her marital relations.'
The jury in the husband's suit in allowing recovery for the family's eco-
nomic loss could make no such nice demarcation between her economic loss
and loss of companionship, comfort, and the other values of the marital
relation. They too are matters of substance and lend themselves to no sharp
discrimination in measuring the joint losses of husband, wife, and children.
They are community losses and should be recovered in the husband's action
as in other actions brought by him for protection of the family's interests.
And here lies the heart of the court's policy of refusing the wife's action on
the basis of "double recovery." To allow another jury in her case to go
about assessing her losses individually would necessarily include what was
common to the family and what the former jury must have considered in
giving so large a recovery in the husband's suit.
It will be noticed that the court did not rule out the recovery of the
wife's losses, or that of their children, if any, in the husband's action. The
court's argument of "double recovery" speaks otherwise. It merely refused
to recognize a separate action on the part of other members of the family for
the home. Liability to the child by the third person was first recognized in Daily v. Parker,
152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945). The doctrine has been approved in several states. See Miller v.
Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949) (mother enticed to leave home). The doctrine
is rejected in Henson v. Thomas, 231 N.C. 173, 56 S.E.2d 432 (1949) (see dissent of Justice
Seawell for a masterpiece of judicial writing), and more recently rejected in Whitcomb v. Huf-
fington, 180 Kan. 340, 304 P.2d 465 (1956) ; Scholberg v. Itnyre, 264 Wis. 211, 58 N.W.2d 698
(1953). In the cases that reject the doctrine it would seem that the courts narrow their per-
spectives too strictly. If the family and home are not entitled to protection in these cases there
would seem little basis for protecting them against any other danger or injury, for here nothing
can be said in behalf of the defendant. It may be added that the suit is ordinarily for the inno-
cent spouse, and in such cases the childrens' losses should be included in his or her suit for
alienation, criminal conversation or whatever the action may be. In cases in which the other
spouse is for some reason disqualified from bringing the suit, then it should be the child's suit.
2 6 Deshotel v. Atchison, T.&S.F. Ry., 144 Cal. App.2d 224, 300 P.2d 910 (1956).
27 One may speculate what the attitude of the supreme court would have been had the
husband's recovery been very small, say $25,000. In the Hitaffer case no doubt the court was
influenced by the fact that the husband was limited by the wholly inadequate provisions of
Workmen's Compensation.
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the family and community losses. The question now is why did not the court
explicitly recognize the right of recovery for the family losses as part of the
husband's recovery and make explicit by its decision that hereafter such
losses may be expressly included in the husband's recovery? The court had
the power to make explicit through decision what has heretofore been con-
cealed under existing procedures and practices, and it also had the power to
say that in the future such items of recovery must be sought once for all in
the suit of the victim or be forever barred." If the court had so said its
decision would no doubt have been accepted and applauded by the profes-
sion. Doubtless one of the reasons for not taking this step was because the
instructions of the trial court did not permit the jury to go so far afield from
the husband's individual injuries, and the supreme court would have had
doctrinal difficulty in supporting its holding that the jury had included the
losses of the family in its verdict. Thus the posture of the wife's case as well
as the posture of the husband's case made such a step embarrassing for the
court.
But the court's denial of the wife's separate suit does not end the matter.
Should some trial court hereafter by express instructions in a suit for the
personal injury of husband, wife or child include the losses to the family
community as items of recovery the supreme court would be given the
opportunity to approve such instructions without embarrassment. Such a
method of dealing with the family interests would preserve the policy of the
common law that vested all such rights of suit in the father as head of the
family. With the recognition of separate rights of suit in recent years by
any member of the family who suffers personal injury, there would be no
departure from this policy by vesting the right of suit for the family losses
in the injured member. In one action all matters growing out of the injury
would be litigated and all interests given protection. This would be wholly
consistent with the objectives of modern procedure. Nor would it be neces-
sary that all members of the family be formally joined as parties. The suit
would be in the nature of a class action.
Legislative or Judicial Function
Courts not infrequently refuse to go forward in tort law until legislative
sanctions have been given. There is no doubt about the legislative function
and power in such cases. But also there is no doubt as to the function and
power of the courts for tort law is particularly the court's own domain. The
only question is whether in the particular case it is good policy to await
legislative action. Tort law has been and will continue to be developed pri-
marily through the judicial process in case by case litigation. Probably most
28 See Great No. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932) ; Kocoureb, Retro-
spective Decisions and Stare Decisis and a Proposal, 17 A.B.A.J. 180 (1931).
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lawyers would agree this is the best way to develop tort law. It is sometimes
called "judicial legislation" but only so by those who do not like what the
court does or those who are ignorant of the procedural and historical dif-
ferences between decisional law and the legislative process. There are many
arguments against awaiting legislative action in the common law area of
torts. Legislatures are not so expert in tort law and tort law policies as are
judges. The legislative record in this area is extremely discordant and dis-
couraging.' Legislation usually covers too much or too little and is fre-
quently couched in restrictive or ambiguous terms which the courts must
modify and refashion to meet their needs. Moreover it is more rigid and
less subject to modification in view of change in either transactional or
environmental facts.
The time of legislatures is so absorbed with public affairs, budgets,
police problems, provision for and regulation of public enterprises, taxation,
and a score of other pressing problems that there is neither time, energy or
interest left for the everyday problems of tort law. It is rare that tort legis-
lation gets either the legislative ear or its approval unless it be supported
by strong pressure groups who come with statutes already prepared and
supported by persuasive advocates. It is hard to reduce the refinements of
tort doctrine to statute form. About all that can be safely done is to give the
courts direction by general terms and leave the refinements to be worked
out through the litigation process. More frequently legislation in the tort
field gives the courts more trouble than it gives assistance. The judicial
history of guest statutes and of some of the provisions of traffic codes weigh
heavily against the intrusion of legislatures into the law of torts.
Legislative Examples
The three important instances in which legislatures have attempted to
give direction to tort law in the family relations area are the death acts,
dram shop acts and the abolition of actions for breach of promise, seduction,
alienation and criminal conversation."0 The first was rendered abortive by
the courts as above discussed. But it is to be noted that the legislatures have
done little to correct the errors of the courts and at present the courts them-
selves are for the most part having to clear the acts of most of the crippling
doctrines by which their purpose was so largely defeated. The second again
29 No better examples are found than in the death and survival statutes. See PRossER, TORTS
705-19 (2d ed. 1955). Parallels of the story told in Cort v. Steen, 36 Cal.2d 437, 224 P.2d 723
(1950) and Hunt v. Authier, 28 Cal.2d 288, 169 P.2d 913 (1946) can be found in nearly all
jurisdictions. The California Legislature finally enacted a rational survival statute in 1949
which is now found in CAL. Civ. CODE § 956, CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 376-77. See also the piece-
meal legislation reflected in 3 VEPNiER, AmERICAN FAimY LAws 87-89; 4 id. 461-77 (1935).
30 See CAL. Civ. CODE J 43.5.
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filled a gap that should have been filled by the courts themselves.31 The
third was the result of the propaganda of certain groups that had special
interests to serve by the abolition of the actions. The legislation was ill
conceived and is creating far more difficulties for the courts than it settled.
Moreover, its essential unjustness is more and more becoming apparent and
the courts must spend a great deal of time whittling away at the provisions
of the legislation in order to give the family protection at its most vulner-
able point."
Now and then the legislature is very helpful on specific points where the
courts have become so entangled in their doctrines that they seem unable
to work themselves free. The recent California legislative act33 declaring
that damages awarded a married person for personal injuries are the sepa-
rate property of such person achieves a good result, but only so in view of
the court's inability to allow such recovery as community property against
the defense of contributory negligence of the other spouse. 4 No doubt the
impulse that made the court hold such damage to be community property in
the first instance was a recognition of the fact that the loss was one suffered
by the whole family rather than merely the individual. But the contributory
negligence doctrine of one of the spouses as a defense to the action was per-
mitted to cancel out the benefits of the doctrine and defeated recovery for
31 The California court attempted to meet the problem as a matter of common law in
Cole v. Rush, 271 P.2d 47 (Cal. 1954), but later vacated its judgment and reverted to orthodox
common law. Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal.2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955). The common law rule is ortho-
doxly stated in State v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951). For excellent treatment of
Illinois Dram Shop Act see 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 775 (1957); Kiriluk v. Cohn, 148 N.E.2d 607
(I. App. 1958) (wife killed drunken husband in self defense, $100,000 recovery for loss of sup-
port against sellers of liquor). See Olgive, Moran, Voelker, Appleman, Horsley, Gambill and
Bliss (symposium), Actions under the Illinois Dram Shop Act, ILLIos LAWS FORUM 175-284
(1958).
3 2 It is interesting to notice how the courts are falling back on their equitable powers to
protect the family in absence of adequate legal remedies. In Henley v. Rockett, 243 Ala. 172,
8 So. 2d 852 (1942), the statute having abolished the action for alienation the court granted an
injunction against defendant. See Webber v. Gray, 307 S.W.2d 80 (Ark. 1957), in which the
Arkansas court granted injunction against the aggressions of a woman who was making life
miserable for the husband and the family.
In some states the statute abolishing the common law remedies has produced a rash of
litigation. See Morris v. MacNab, 25 N.J. 271, 135 A.2d 657 (1957) ; Grobart v. Grobart, 5 N.J.
161, 74 A.2d 294 (1950); Magierowski v. Buckley, 39 N.J. Super. 534, 121 A.2d 749 (1956);
Stickles v. Manss, 36 N.J. Super. 95, 114 A.2d 771 (1955). See PROSSER, TORTS 697 (2d ed. 1955).
3 3 CAL. Civ. CODE § 163.5. See Comment, 9 HAsTivGS L.J. 291 (1958).
3 4 Kesler v. Pabst, 43 Cal.2d 254, 273 P.2d 257 (1954). If the husband is dead then his
contributory negligence does not defeat action: Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal.2d 622, 248 P.2d 922
(1952); Comment, The Impact of the Community Property System on Tort Suits, 42 CAIIF.
L. REv. 486 (1954); Note, 42 CALiW. L. RaV. 310 (1954). Also see Green, Texas Death Act,
26 TEXAS L. RaV. 461, 485 (1948) and Soto v. Vandeventer, 56 N.M. 483, 245 P.2d 826 (1952)
(repudiates defense).
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anyone. It would probably have been much better for the court to have
held that the injured spouse could recover for the community but because
of the negligence of the other spouse any loss to him must not be included3 5
By not meeting the situation, the courts practically forced the legislature
to make the recovery the separate property of the spouse though in fact
the whole family is concerned. Incidentally the logic of the situation thus
created should compel the court to recognize the right of the wife to recover
for her loss of consortium as her separate property, and the refusal to do so
is logically in conflict with the legislative judgment expressed in this pro-
vision of the Civil Code.
Recognition of the Family Loss
But logic neither more than doctrine decides cases though neither should
be needlessly offended. The court saw in the Deshotel case what it consid-
ered injustice-permitting the wife to recover for her loss of consortium
which necessarily is a product of the community marital relations. It
refused to countenance the injustice of a second suit covering much if not
all the same ground the jury must have considered in her husband's action.
The problem now awaits legislative action which will be slow if it ever
comes. Why would not the easier and more rational conclusion be simply
to enlarge the coverage of the victim's suit to include the whole of the fam-
ily loss? There could be no injustice here. The family has suffered from the
victim's hurt. His obligations to the family and the family's obligations to
him are both greatly affected. Why not openly and avowedly give the law's
recognition to the fact? Especially so when the call of the family environ-
ment cannot be kept out of the picture? But inasmuch as the court has
remitted the problem to the legislature, why should it not clarify this prob-
lem by providing that in all suits based on the injury to any member of the
family the interests of the family shall be taken into account and damages,
if any, shall be awarded for the family's loss as well as for the injuries to
the individual? In cases where the two can be separated the jury can be
instructed to make separate awards to the individual and to the community.
In this way the family's interests would be given the protection they deserve
without further litigation. All that would seem to be required is for either
35 In the death cases many jurisdictions simply deny any recovery for the negligent bene-
ficiary even though the recovery is in gross. Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill.2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525
(1956) (repudiating its doctrine to the contrary as stated in Hazel v. Hoopeston-Danville Motor
Bus Co., 310 Ill. 38,141 N.E. 392 (1923)); Lindley v. Sink, 218 Ind. 1, 30 N.E.2d 456 (1940).
For exhaustive discussion of contributory negligence as defense to death action see Buckley v.
Chadwick, 45 Cal.2d 183, 288 P.2d 12 (1955). See dissent by Carter, J., id. at 203, 288 P.2d
at 24; Nourse, Is Contributory Negligence of Deceased a Defense to a Wrongful Death Action?,
42 C .L. REv. 310 (1954).
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the court or the legislature to lift its eyes so as to see the problem in per-
spective.
Indeed, a very recent decision would seem to indicate that the Supreme
Court of Washington has already lifted up its eyes. In Erhardt v. Havens,
Inc.,36 decided on October 30, 1958, the infant appellants sued respondent
hospital for their loss due to negligence resulting in the permanent paralysis
of their mother. The court in denying their action concluded:
"With commendable forthrightness appellants' counsel concedes that
this action is not sanctioned by the common law but that the court should
extend the common law and create it. This we might do under compelling
necessity, but we find no occasion to do so here because the father himself,
who is the guardian of the infant appellants, may maintain that action in
his own name, and, by the respondent's concession, recover every item of
damage claimed by the appellants."
36 ........ Wash ......... 330 P.2d 1010 (1958).
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